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I. Introduction 
Congress amended § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code1 
in 1996, inserting the word “physical” into § 104(a)(2)’s “personal 
injury or sickness” exclusion from gross income.2 Section 
104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion now applies to only damages 
received “on account of personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness.”3 Congress’s amendment further provided that 
“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or 
physical sickness.”4 Before Congress’s change, the exclusion from 
gross income applied to all “personal injuries,” regardless of 
whether they were physical, nonphysical, or emotional.5  
Since Congress amended § 104(a)(2), courts have struggled to 
uniformly apply the exclusion and have begun to extend it beyond 
only physical injuries and physical sicknesses.6 Part of this 
struggle is due to the inherent difficulty with defining the word 
“physical.”7 Significantly, however, the struggle is mostly to do 
with the fact that the judicial test used to determine what 
amounts fall within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion developed when the 
                                                                                                     
 1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006). Unless otherwise provided, all section 
references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
 2. See infra Part IV (discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996). 
 3. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 4. I.R.C. § 104(a) (flush language). 
 5. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992) (noting that 
the exclusion’s scope had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but 
that it was now settled that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the 
individual”). 
 6. See infra Part VI (discussing the conflicting Tax Court cases). 
 7. See G. Christopher Wright, Comment, Taxation of Personal Injury 
Awards: Addressing the Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues § 104(a)(2) of the Tax 
Code, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 211 (2010) (noting the difficulty faced when 
attempting to define “physical”). 
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exclusion applied to all “personal injuries.”8 Although Congress 
limited § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to only physical injuries and 
physical sicknesses, courts have not adjusted the test used to 
determine what amounts fall within the exclusion.9 This Note 
proposes that courts modify the test used to exclude damage 
awards under § 104(a)(2) to accommodate the added “physical” 
requirement.10 The proposed test will allow § 104(a)(2) to be 
uniformly applied to only physical injuries and physical 
sicknesses in the way that Congress intended. 
Every year taxpayers must calculate their gross income to 
determine the tax they must pay. To do this, taxpayers must 
know what amounts are included in gross income under § 6111 
and what amounts can be excluded from gross income under 
other Tax Code provisions. In 2011, disputes over what amounts 
are included in gross income and what amounts can be excluded 
were among the most litigated taxation issues.12 Personal injury 
claimants—physical and nonphysical—are awarded millions of 
dollars each year.13 Thus, § 104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion is 
consistently one of the most litigated exclusionary provisions.14  
                                                                                                     
 8. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995) (determining that 
for a recovery to be excluded under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that 
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon tort or tort type 
rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on account of personal injuries or 
sickness’”). 
 9. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996 
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or 
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional 
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under 
that section.” (citation omitted)).  
 10. See infra Part VII (proposing a new test). 
 11. I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (providing the Tax Code’s definition of gross income). 
 12. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 56 
(2011), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irs_tas_arc2011_exec_summary.pdf. 
 13. See Genny Barret, Note, Did the Sixth Circuit Get It Right in Stadnyk? 
What To Do About the § 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Damages Exclusion, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2011) (“Each year, millions of dollars are awarded to 
victims of physical and non-physical personal injury.”). 
 14. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 472 
(2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_mli.pdf (“Taxation of damage 
awards spurs litigation every year.”); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 211 
(noting that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion is one of the most litigated issues in federal 
courts). 
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Part II of this Note outlines the history of the “personal 
injury” exclusion before Congress added the word “physical.”15 
Part III discusses judicial opinions limiting the scope of 
§ 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” language.16 Congress’s amendment to 
§ 104(a)(2) is detailed in Part IV,17 and the circuit courts’ 
response to the amendment is discussed in Part V.18 Part VI of 
this Note analyzes three Tax Court cases that illustrate the 
struggle in applying the amended § 104(a)(2) exclusion.19 To 
remedy the confusion surrounding § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion since its 
amendment, this Note proposes a new judicial test in Part VII.20 
Finally, this Note concludes in Part VIII.21 
II. Development of the “Personal Injury” Exclusion 
A. Early Development 
Before the first personal injury exclusion appeared in 
Chapter 18, § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918,22 the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) indicated, in Treasury 
Decision 2135, that amounts received for personal injury were 
taxable as “gains or profits and income derived from any source 
whatsoever.”23 Treasury Regulation 33, which stated, “An amount 
received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury, 
being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Part II (discussing the personal injury exclusion’s history). 
 16. See infra Part III (discussing judicial opinions interpreting “on account 
of”). 
 17. See infra Part IV (discussing the 1996 amendments). 
 18. See infra Part V (discussing circuit court opinions following the 1996 
amendments). 
 19. See infra Part VI (discussing three conflicting Tax Court opinions). 
 20. See infra Part VII (proposing a new test). 
 21. See infra Part VIII (conclusion). 
 22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. 
 23. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915) (“An amount received 
as a result of suit or compromise for ‘pain and suffering’ is held to be such 
income as would be taxable under the provision of law that includes ‘gains or 
profits and income derived from any source whatsoever.’”); see also Patrick E. 
Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical But Leaves the 
Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 56–57 (1997) (noting 
Treasury’s early treatment of personal injury awards). 
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accounted for as income,” later confirmed Treasury’s indication.24 
The tax treatment of personal injury awards changed in 1918, 
however, when the Attorney General urged Treasury to find 
accident insurance proceeds nontaxable.25  
The Attorney General’s opinion rested on the idea that 
accident insurance proceeds represented a return of capital.26 
With tangible assets such as real property, the taxpayer’s 
invested capital is measured by the amount the taxpayer paid to 
acquire the property.27 This acquisition “cost” can be 
subsequently adjusted.28 This cost is the taxpayer’s basis in such 
property.29 Later, when a taxpayer disposes of the property, she is 
only taxed on the amount in excess of her basis, or gain.30 The 
amount she receives equaling her basis in the property is her 
“return of capital” and is not taxed.31  
Applied to personal injury damages, the return of capital 
approach excludes from income damages equaling the taxpayer’s 
capital invested in oneself.32 This “human capital” theory stands 
for the principle that accident proceeds and damage awards 
                                                                                                     
 24. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 4 (1918); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 57 
(stating that Regulation 33 confirmed that Treasury regarded personal injury 
awards as taxable). 
 25. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 (1918) (urging Treasury to find accident 
insurance proceeds excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 
57 (noting that the tax treatment of personal injury awards reversed in 1918 
when the Attorney General urged Treasury to find accident insurance proceeds 
excludable from income). 
 26. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 308 (arguing that accident proceeds “merely 
take the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident”); 
see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 63 (discussing the Attorney General’s 
extension of “the notion of capital value replacement to the human body”). 
 27. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2006) (defining basis in one’s property as “the cost of 
such property”). 
 28. See id. § 1016 (adjusting basis “for expenditures, receipts, losses, or 
other items, properly chargeable to [a] capital account”). 
 29. See id. § 1012 (defining basis as “the cost of such property”). 
 30. See id. § 1001 (providing that a taxpayer’s gain on such property is the 
difference between the “amount realized” and the basis in the property). 
 31. See Debra Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of 
Punitive Damages “On Account Of” United States v. Schleier, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 920 (1996) (“The return of capital approach, as applied to the taxation 
of personal injury damages, excludes from income damages equal to the 
taxpayer’s capital invested in the injured item.”). 
 32. Id. 
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should not be taxed because the proceeds are merely a substitute 
for capital invested in oneself that was diminished in the 
accident.33 Because the proceeds represent a “return of capital” 
equal to the taxpayer’s invested capital in herself, the proceeds do 
not increase the taxpayer’s wealth.34 Instead, the accident 
proceeds simply return the taxpayer to her pre-injury condition.35 
This approach is difficult, however, because invested “human 
capital” in terms of cost to the owner—the owner’s basis—is often 
zero.36 Moreover, if cost could theoretically be established, it is 
nearly impossible for a court to allocate accident proceeds to an 
abstract notion of “human capital.”37  
Nonetheless, Treasury accepted the Attorney General’s 
rationale when it issued Treasury Decision 2747.38 Treasury 
Decision 2747 excluded personal injury awards from income, 
stating that “an amount received by an individual as a result of a 
suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained by him 
through accident is not income.”39 Congress agreed with 
Treasury, and promptly codified the exclusion when it passed the 
Revenue Act of 1918.40 At the time, Congress believed personal 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 63 (“This human capital argument rests on 
the principle that if an ability or function of the human body, which previously 
allowed the taxpayer to produce income, is diminished through an accident, 
then the proceeds are merely a substitute for that ability or function.”). 
 34. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 31, at 919–20 (stating that a return of 
capital does not increase wealth). 
 35. See id. at 919 (explaining that damages would “return the taxpayer to 
her pre-injury condition”). 
 36. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 64 (explaining that often “[t]he cost to the 
owner of ‘human capital’ is zero”); see also Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no tax basis in a person’s health and other 
personal interests . . . .”). 
 37. See Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A 
Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 
278 (2007) (stating that it would be “virtually impossible” for courts to 
determine how much of an “award compensated for the loss of one’s own 
consumption of human capital”). 
 38. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); see Hobbs, supra note 23, 
at 64 (noting Treasury’s acceptance of the Attorney General’s rationale). 
 39. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); see Hobbs, supra note 23, 
at 64. 
 40. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (“Amounts 
received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the 
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injury compensation payments to be a return of human capital, 
and thus not constitutionally taxable “income” under the 
Sixteenth Amendment.41 
Although the statute used the language “personal injuries or 
sickness,”42 Treasury rejected extending the exclusion to the 
alienation of a wife’s affections, interpreting the exclusion to 
apply to “physical injuries only.”43 Later, however, in the wake of 
the now-overruled U.S. Supreme Court decision, Eisner v. 
Macomber,44 in which the Court defined income narrowly to 
include “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined,”45 Treasury created an administrative exclusion for 
nonphysical personal injuries.46 Treasury’s administrative 
exclusion became a judicial exclusion in 1927 when the Board of 
Tax Appeals—now the Tax Court—relied on Eisner’s narrow 
definition of income to determine that a settlement award in a 
defamation suit was not taxable “income.”47 Twenty-eight years 
later, the Supreme Court drastically broadened its definition of 
income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, Co.48 to include any 
                                                                                                     
amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of 
such injuries or sickness.”). 
 41. See Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(“Congress first enacted the personal injury compensation exclusion . . . when 
such payments were considered the return of human capital, and thus not 
constitutionally taxable ‘income’ under the 16th Amendment.”). 
 42. Revenue Act of 1918 § 213(b)(6). 
 43. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920); see Hobbs, supra note 23, at 66 (discussing 
Senate Bill 1384 and that Treasury “rejected the extension of the ‘human 
capital’ approach to every personal injury”).  
 44. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that a “stock 
dividend” was not income). 
 45. Id. at 207. 
 46. See Sol. Op. 132, 1 C.B. 92 (1922) (determining that damages received 
for alienation of affections, defamation, and for the surrender of child custody 
rights were excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 67 
(discussing Treasury’s conclusion in Solicitor’s Opinion 132 that the receipts at 
issue were excludable from gross income based upon the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Eisner). 
 47. See Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927) (relying on Eisner 
to conclude that a taxpayer’s settlement award in a defamation suit was 
excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 67–68 (discussing the 
court’s analysis and conclusion in Hawkins). 
 48. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that 
punitive damages fell within I.R.C. § 22(a)’s definition of income because they 
were “instances of undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over 
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“accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion.”49 In Glenshaw, the Court 
observed that Congress intended “to tax all gains except those 
specifically exempted.”50 Despite this broad definition, the 
personal injury exclusion—now § 104(a)(2)—continued to be 
applied to nonphysical personal injuries.51  
B. The “Personal Injury” Exclusion After Glenshaw Glass 
In Glenshaw Glass, the Court reiterated that “personal 
injury recoveries [were] nontaxable on the theory that they 
roughly correspond to a return of capital.”52 The Court 
determined, however, that the same restoration-of-capital theory 
could not justify excluding punitive damages from income.53  
Subsequent to Glenshaw Glass, the Internal Revenue Service 
(the Service) issued a series of revenue rulings reaffirming that 
nonphysical personal injury receipts were excludable from 
income.54 And in 1972, in Seay v. Commissioner,55 the Tax Court 
                                                                                                     
which the taxpayers have complete dominion”). 
 49. Id. at 432. 
 50. Id. at 430. 
 51. See infra Part II.B (discussing the exclusion after Glenshaw Glass). 
 52. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (holding that former World War 
II prisoners-of-war’s receipts for losses of personal rights were not includable in 
gross income); Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20 (determining that payments 
made to former Korean War captives “as compensation for the loss of their 
personal rights . . . [were] not includible in the gross income”); Rev. Rul. 56-518, 
1956-2 C.B. 25 (“[C]ompensation paid by . . . Germany to citizens or residents of 
the United States . . . on account of . . . damage to life, body, health, liberty, or to 
professional or economic advancement, are in the nature of reimbursement for 
the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do not constitute taxable 
income . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (determining that, for the same 
reasons as in Revenue Ruling 56-518, compensation paid by the Federal 
Republic of Austria did not constitute taxable income); see also Hobbs, supra 
note 23, at 70 (discussing the Service’s rulings and their renewal of the position 
that nonphysical personal injury receipts were excludable). 
 55. Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972) (holding that § 104(a)(2) excluded 
the taxpayer’s settlement award for personal injury claims); see Hobbs, supra 
note 23, at 71–72 (discussing the Tax Court decision in Seay and noting that the 
decision was the first time a court addressed the “application of the statutory 
exclusion to nonphysical injuries”). 
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similarly reaffirmed that the exclusion extended to nonphysical 
injuries.56 In Seay, the Tax Court concluded that a $45,000 
payment as “compensation for . . . personal embarrassment, 
mental and physical strain and injury to health and personal 
reputation” was excludable from income under § 104(a)(2).57 The 
court cited Revenue Ruling 58-418, and its earlier decision in 
Hawkins v. Commissioner,58 in support of its conclusion that the 
payment at issue fell within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.59 Hawkins 
had analogized recovery for injury to personal reputation with 
compensation by way of life insurance proceeds, and found 
damages received for libel and slander to be excluded from 
income.60 
Eleven years later, the Ninth Circuit seemingly erased any 
doubt as to whether § 104(a)(2)’s personal injury exclusion 
applied to nonphysical personal injuries in Roemer v. 
Commissioner.61 In Roemer, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax 
Court’s decision below, concluding that an entire jury award in a 
defamation suit was excludable from income under § 104(a)(2).62 
But shortly thereafter, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 85-
143,63 stating that it would follow the Tax Court’s conclusion 
including the defamation award in income, rather than the Ninth 
Circuit’s reversal.64 Finally, however, the Tax Court ended the 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Seay, 58 T.C. at 38 (finding that § 104(a)(2) extended to the 
taxpayer’s nonphysical personal injuries). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927) (holding that damages 
received for libel and slander were excludable from income).  
 59. See Seay, 58 T.C. at 40 (stating that Hawkins and Revenue Ruling 54-
518 supported the finding that the payment at issue was exempt from taxation 
under § 104(a)(2)).  
 60. See Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024–25 (analogizing a recovery for injury to 
personal reputation with compensation by way of life insurance proceeds, and 
finding the damages at issue to be excludable from income). 
 61. See Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
a defamation award was excludable from income because “[t]he ordinary 
meaning of a personal injury is not limited to a physical one”). 
 62. See id. at 700–01 (concluding that the award was excludable from gross 
income under § 104(a)(2)). 
 63. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55. 
 64. See id. (stating that the Service would not follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Roemer and would instead follow the Tax Court’s decision including 
the defamation award in income). 
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debate in Threlkeld v. Commissioner65 when it determined that 
“personal injury” was not limited to a “physical injury.”66 
Congress, though, would have its voice heard on the matter 
before the end of the decade.67 
C. The 1989 Amendments 
In 1989, the House of Representatives proposed amending 
§ 104(a)(2) to read, “[G]ross income does not include . . . the 
amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal 
injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical 
sickness.”68 According to the accompanying committee report, the 
House was attempting to override judicial applications of 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to nonphysical personal injuries.69 
Congress rejected the proposed amendment, however.70 Instead, 
the final amendment read, “[Section 104(a)(2)] shall not apply to 
any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving 
physical injury or physical sickness.”71 The final amendment 
“impliedly extended § 104(a)(2) to compensatory awards for 
nonphysical injuries,”72 a result contrary to the House’s proposed 
                                                                                                     
 65. Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986) (stating that § 104(a)(2) 
extended beyond physical injuries). 
 66. See id. (“A personal injury has long been understood to include 
nonphysical as well as physical injuries.”). 
 67. See infra Part II.C (discussing the 1989 amendments to § 104(a)(2)). 
 68. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, § 11641 (1989) (emphasis 
added); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (noting that the House of 
Representatives proposed the amendment). 
 69. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 1344–55 (1989) (stating that courts had 
extended § 104(a)(2) to “awards for personal injury that do not relate to a 
physical injury or sickness” and that the “committee believes that such 
treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is involved”); see 
also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (“The accompanying committee report 
confirmed the House’s recognition that courts were interpreting § 104(a)(2) too 
broadly.”). 
 70. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (“The conference committee rejected the 
proposed amendment . . . .”). 
 71. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 
§ 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Hobbs, supra note 
23, at 74–75. 
 72. Hobbs, supra note 23, at 75. 
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intentions.73 All courts were now free to apply § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion to nonphysical injuries.74 This judicial freedom led to 
confusion in lower courts as to how to apply § 104(a)(2) to 
nonphysical injuries, especially in the context of recovery for 
employment discrimination.75 This confusion ultimately 
compelled the Supreme Court to intercede.76 
D. A Two-Part Test Emerges 
In the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two 
employment discrimination cases, resulting in a two-part test for 
damage awards to be excluded under § 104(a)(2).77 To exclude 
damage awards under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that 
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon 
tort or tort type rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on 
account of personal injuries or sickness.’”78 Subsequent 
congressional and judicial action refined the Court’s two-part 
test, but the framework remained applicable.79 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. (“This was precisely the opposite of the intent of the House 
provision . . . .”). 
 74. See id. (noting that courts were “free to apply § 104(a)(2) to nonphysical 
injuries”). 
 75. See id. at 75–78 (noting that “courts struggled in determining the 
applicability of § 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination recoveries” and 
discussing the events leading up to United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)). 
 76. See id. (noting that “courts struggled in determining the applicability of 
§ 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination recoveries” and discussing the events 
leading up to Burke). 
 77. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995) (determining that 
for a recovery to be excluded under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that 
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon tort or tort type 
rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on account of personal injuries or 
sickness’”); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992) (determining that 
damages received must redress tort or tort-like personal injury claims to be 
excluded under § 104(a)(2)); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81 (stating that, 
after Schleier, a taxpayer must satisfy two separate requirements to exclude a 
damage award under § 104(a)(2)). 
 78. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336–37. 
 79. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (finding that 
subsequent congressional action merely imposed additional requirements to 
Schleier’s two-part test, but did not otherwise alter Schleier’s framework). 
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1. United States v. Burke 
In 1992, the U.S Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Burke.80 Burke held that the taxpayers’ backpay awards received 
as settlement of their claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 196481 (Title VII) were not excludable from income under 
§ 104(a)(2).82 The Court’s decision did not hinge on whether the 
claims were physical or nonphysical, however.83 Instead, the 
Court specifically addressed whether an award of back wages 
redressed a “tort-like personal injury within the meaning of 
§ 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations.”84 Because Title VII 
did not allow compensatory damages and limited the available 
remedies to “backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief,” the 
Court concluded that Title VII did not redress “a tort-like 
personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the 
applicable regulations.”85 Before concluding that Title VII 
backpay awards were not excludable from respondent’s gross 
income under § 104(a)(2),86 however, the Court acknowledged a 
few important precepts of both the Tax Code and § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion. 
The Court first noted that the Tax Code’s definition of gross 
income “sweeps broadly”87 to include “all income from whatever 
                                                                                                     
 80. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding that “the 
backpay awards received by respondents in settlement of their Title VII claims 
[were] not excludable from gross income as ‘damages received . . . on account of 
personal injuries’ under § 104(a)(2)” (alteration in original)). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 82. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242. 
 83. See id. at 241 (finding that Title VII backpay awards did not redress a 
“tort-like personal injury” and thus could not be excluded from gross income). 
 84. See id. (concluding that the award of back wages under a Title VII 
claim did not redress tort-like personal injuries); see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) 
(2006); 26 CFR § 1.104-1(c) (1991) (“The term ‘damages received (whether by 
suit or agreement)’ means an amount received (other than workmen’s 
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or 
tort type rights.”). 
 85. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241.  
 86. Id. at 241–42 (concluding that the award of back wages under a Title 
VII claim did not redress tort or tort-like personal injuries and were thus not 
excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)). 
 87. Id. at 233. 
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source derived.”88 Further, the Court acknowledged Congress’s 
intention to exert its full taxing power when enacting § 61(a).89 
Also, the Court noted that after its decision in Glenshaw Glass, it 
has interpreted any “accession to wealth” to be within the 
definition of gross income.90 Although gross income includes any 
accession to wealth, exclusions from gross income must be 
“specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code.”91 Additionally, 
these specifically enumerated exclusions from gross income are 
“narrowly construed.”92 Finally, the Court acknowledged that 
although courts once interpreted the personal injury exclusion to 
encompass only “physical” injuries, it was now well accepted that 
the exclusion encompassed nonphysical injuries as well.93  
2. Commissioner v. Schleier 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s next contribution to § 104(a)(2) 
came three years later when it decided Commissioner v. 
Schleier.94 Similar to the issue addressed in Burke, the Court 
considered whether § 104(a)(2) authorized the taxpayer to 
exclude the amount received as settlement for his claims for both 
backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) from his gross income.95 Half of the 
taxpayer’s settlement was attributed to backpay and half to 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006)). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 
426, 431 (1955)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 248 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the “default rule of 
statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly 
construed”). 
 93. See id. at 235 n.6 (majority opinion) (noting that the exclusion’s scope 
had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but that it was now settled 
that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the individual”). 
 94. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (holding that § 104(a)(2) did 
not exclude respondent’s recovery for back wages under the ADEA). 
 95. See id. at 324–25 (“The question presented is whether 
§ 104(a)(2) . . . authorizes a taxpayer to exclude from his gross income the 
amount received in settlement of a claim for backpay and liquidated damages 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).”). 
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liquidated damages.96 The Tax Court determined the entire 
amount to be excludable, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The 
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that § 104(a)(2) did 
not exclude the taxpayer’s ADEA recovery.97 
As in Burke, the Court emphasized the broadly sweeping 
definition of gross income and the corollary that exclusions must 
be construed narrowly.98 And also as it did in Burke, the Court 
looked to the available remedies under the ADEA, noting that the 
ADEA allowed for liquidated damages “only in cases of willful 
violations” and that the ADEA did not permit a “separate 
recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or 
emotional distress.”99 The Court, however, did not first analyze 
the claim under Burke’s “tort or tort-type rights” standard for 
excludability. Instead, the Court went on to determine whether 
the settlement award was “on account of personal injuries.”100 
The Court used injuries resulting from an automobile 
accident as an example to illustrate its idea of what constituted a 
“personal injury.”101 In the Court’s example, a taxpayer’s medical 
expenses, lost wages, and pain, suffering, and emotional distress 
would all be excludable under § 104(a)(2) as being on account of 
personal injuries arising out of the automobile accident.102 The 
Court compared backpay in the present case to lost wages 
resulting from the hypothetical automobile accident.103 But unlike 
the lost wages in the automobile accident example, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. at 326 (“Half of respondent’s award was attributed to ‘backpay’ 
and half to ‘liquidated damages.’”). 
 97. See id. at 327 (stating that the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit allowed 
the amount to be excluded, but reversing those decisions). 
 98. See id. at 327–28 (noting the “sweeping scope” of § 61(a) and that 
exclusions from income are narrowly construed). 
 99. Id. at 326. 
 100. See id. at 328–32 (determining whether the backpay portion or the 
liquidated damages portion of respondent’s settlement was “on account of 
personal injuries”). 
 101. See id. at 328–31 (noting potential claims and injuries arising out of a 
hypothetical car crash to illustrate an example of a personal injury). 
 102. See id. at 329–30 (determining that all recoveries associated with 
injuries arising out an automobile accident would be excludable under 
§ 104(a)(2)). 
 103. See id. at 330–31 (comparing respondent’s recovery of back wages to 
recovery for lost wages that hypothetically resulted from injuries sustained in a 
car accident). 
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determined that the taxpayer’s backpay was not excludable.104 
The Court reasoned that the taxpayer’s back wages were not 
excludable because any personal injury caused by the age 
discrimination was not in any way linked to the loss of wages.105 
Thus, age discrimination directly causes two distinct injuries, 
only one of which is a personal injury.106 First, the employer’s 
conduct directly causes lost wages. Second, the tortious conduct 
often causes a nonphysical personal injury. The lost wages, 
however, do not flow from the personal injury and therefore do 
not meet § 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement. 
After the Court concluded that the recovery of back wages 
under the ADEA was not on account of any personal injury, it 
then addressed respondent’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded 
the liquidated damages portion of the award.107 The Court 
concluded that the liquidated damages also could not be 
excluded.108 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged that the liquidated damages might have come 
within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion had that been Congress’s 
intention.109 Justice Stevens, however, found nothing to indicate 
that Congress intended the ADEA’s liquidated damages to 
compensate “personal rather than economic” injuries.110 Instead, 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. (“[Section] 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of 
respondent’s back wages because the recovery of back wages was not ‘on account 
of’ any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of 
back wages recovered.”). 
 105. See id. at 330 (“In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both 
personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.”); see also 
Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81–82 (stating that Justice Stevens’s language, when 
writing for the majority in determining that a recovery under the ADEA was not 
a personal injury, “defie[d] logic”). 
 106. Cf. Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that employment discrimination causes two distinct injuries). 
 107. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1995) (addressing the 
potential excludability of respondent’s liquidated damages portion). 
 108. See id. (concluding that “liquidated damages under the ADEA, like 
back wages under the ADEA, are not received ‘on account of personal injury or 
sickness’”). 
 109. See id. at 331 (determining that the Court’s previous observation—that 
the liquidated damages authorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, may compensate for some “obscure” injuries—did 
not necessarily mean that Congress intended the ADEA’s liquidated damages 
provision to be “personal rather than economic”). 
 110. Id.  
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Justice Stevens found the ADEA’s liquidated damages provision 
to be punitive in nature.111 Accordingly, he concluded that the 
recovery’s liquidated damages portion, along with the portion 
attributed to backpay, was not received “on account of personal 
injury of sickness.”112 
Next, the Court examined whether the taxpayer’s ADEA 
recovery was “based upon ‘tort or tort type rights’ as that term 
was construed in Burke.”113 Again the Court looked to the ADEA’s 
remedial scheme, declared that the jury trial and liquidated 
damages provisions were not sufficient to bring an ADEA 
recovery within the ambit of § 104(a)(2), and concluded that “a 
recovery under the ADEA [was] not one that is ‘based upon tort 
or tort type rights.’”114  
Throughout its opinion, the Court seemed uncomfortable 
applying § 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries.115 But the Court did 
not go so far as to provide a rule limiting the exclusion to physical 
injuries.116 Instead, Justice Stevens articulated a two-part test for 
excludability under § 104(a)(2).117 First, a taxpayer must 
“demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to 
the recovery is ‘based upon tort or tort type rights.’”118 Second, the 
taxpayer must “show that the damages were received on ‘account 
of personal injuries or sickness.’”119 For a recovery to be 
excludable, a taxpayer must satisfy Schleier’s two independent 
requirements.120  
                                                                                                     
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 332. 
 113. See id. at 334–36 (addressing respondent’s argument that the recovery 
was excludable under Burke). 
 114. See id. at 335–36 (determining that neither the ADEA’s jury trial 
provision nor its liquidated damages provision were sufficient to bring a 
recovery under the ADEA within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion). 
 115. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 82 (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Burke and Schleier clearly exhibited the Court’s discomfort in applying 
§ 104(a)(2) in a nonphysical context.”). 
 116. See id. (noting that the Court did not “articulate a rule limiting 
§ 104(a)(2) to physical injuries”). 
 117. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995) (articulating a two-
part test). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 336–37 (stating the “two independent requirements that a 
taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2)”). 
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Since Schleier, many courts have conceded that a recovery 
was “based upon tort or tort type rights,”121 and Treasury has 
recently finalized regulations eliminating the requirement 
entirely.122 Instead, courts have focused on whether the damages 
were received on account of a personal injury.123 Schleier, 
however, provided little detail on when a recovery is on account of 
a personal injury.124 After Schleier, courts added more definition 
to the on account of requirement,125 but Schleier’s framework 
remained the standard.126 
III. The Courts Refine § 104(a)(2)’s “On Account Of” Requirement 
In O’Gilvie v. United States,127 the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed whether § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages, and 
provided a narrow interpretation of § 104(a)(2)’s on account of 
requirement.128 The Court concluded that the petitioner’s 
punitive damages were not received on account of personal 
                                                                                                     
 121. See, e.g., Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 3 (2010) 
(concluding summarily that the taxpayer’s action was based upon tort or tort-
type rights). 
 122. See, Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (excluding from gross 
income damages “on account of personal injuries or sickness”). 
 123. See e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996) (holding 
that “on account of” required a stronger causal connection than “but for,” and 
that only “damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal 
injuries” could be excluded under § 104(a)(2)). 
 124. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81 (“The Court did not provide a test for 
determining when an amount was received for personal injury, in effect saying, 
we will know it when we see it.”). 
 125. See infra Part III (discussing court opinions interpreting “on account 
of”). 
 126. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996 
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or 
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional 
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under 
that section.” (citation omitted)). 
 127. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996) (holding that “on 
account of” required a stronger causal connection than “but for,” and that only 
“damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries” 
could be excluded under § 104(a)(2)). 
 128. See id. at 82 (resolving a circuit split on the proper interpretation of 
Schleier’s “on account of” requirement). 
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injuries and thus not excludable under § 104(a)(2).129 The Court 
rejected the petitioner’s argument that § 104(a)(2) only required a 
“but for” connection between the damages received and the 
underlying personal injury.130 Instead, the Court agreed with the 
Government that § 104(a)(2) was “applicable only to those 
personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, 
or because of” the underlying personal injury.131  
Although O’Gilvie did not explicitly determine what damages 
fell within its interpretation, the Court narrowly interpreted 
§ 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement132 in accord with 
customary Tax Code interpretation.133 After O’Gilvie, lower courts 
continued to refine § 104(a)(2)’s requirement.134 
A. The “Direct Causal Link” 
In Banaitis v. Commissioner,135 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a taxpayer’s economic and 
punitive damages recovered in his wrongful termination suit fell 
within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.136 In Banaitis, the taxpayer 
received $8,728,599 as settlement for his various claims against 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. at 81 (“We conclude that the punitive damages here were not 
received ‘on account of’ personal injuries; hence [section 104(a)(2)] does not 
apply, and the damages are taxable.”). 
 130. See id. at 82 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument for “but for” 
causation). 
 131. See id. at 83 (agreeing with the Government’s interpretation of the 
statute). 
 132. See id. at 82 (rejecting petitioner’s broad reading of § 104(a)(2)’s “on 
account of” requirement). 
 133. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment) (noting the “default rule of statutory interpretation 
that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed”). 
 134. See infra Part III.A (discussing the lower courts’ interpretation of 
§ 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” requirement). 
 135. Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the taxpayer’s economic and punitive damages recovered in his wrongful 
termination suit against his former employer were not “on account of” personal 
injuries and thus not excludable under § 104(a)(2)), rev’d on other grounds, 
Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).  
 136. See id. at 1079–81 (considering whether a taxpayer’s economic and 
punitive damages recovered in his wrongful termination suit fell within 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion). 
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his former employer.137 The taxpayer claimed that § 104(a)(2) 
excluded the full amount,138 but the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the entire amount was taxable.139 
Banaitis alleged that his employers’ conduct resulted in a 
number of physical injuries.140 Those injuries included 
“headaches, insomnia, gastrointestinal disorders, bleeding gums, 
and various orthopedic problems.”141 Addressing whether the 
award satisfied the “on account of” requirement, the court stated 
that to satisfy § 104(a)(2)’s second prong, the taxpayer must show 
the “damage award [was] more than only proximately caused by 
[his employer’s] tortious conduct; it must also be directly causally 
related to [his] personal injuries.”142 Further, the court stated 
that the on account of requirement “can only be satisfied if there 
is ‘a direct causal link’ between the damages and the personal 
injuries sustained.”143 The court noted that in the ordinary 
personal injury tort action, it is relatively easy to discern what 
damages are on account of a personal injury: 
The tortious act causes personal injuries which, in turn, cause 
further damages, such as economic loss due to physical 
inability to work. Thus, in the paradigmatic personal injury 
case, both non-pecuniary damages (such as pain and suffering) 
and economic damages (such as wage loss, diminished work 
capacity, etc.) may be excluded from gross income because the 
losses are “on account of” personal injury.144 
When damages arise from “economic or commercial tort” 
actions, on the other hand, it is more difficult to discern what 
damages are on account of personal injuries.145 Put another way, 
                                                                                                     
 137. See id. at 1078 (noting the taxpayer’s settlement recovery). 
 138. See id. (noting the taxpayer’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded his 
award). 
 139. See id. at 1080–81 (concluding that the taxpayer’s award was fully 
taxable). 
 140. See id. at 1076 (“Troubled by his employment situation, Banaitis 
apparently suffered a host of physical maladies.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1080 (citing Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1995)). 
 143. Id. (citing Fabry v. Comm’r, 223 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. (noting that “economic or commercial tort actions present a 
different circumstance,” and that “the ‘direct causal link’ question requires a 
fact-specific analysis”). 
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it is more difficult to establish the requisite “direct causal link” 
between the damages received and the personal injuries 
sustained.146 The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n such economic or 
commercial tort cases, economic damages are often caused solely 
by the tortious action itself, rather than as a consequence of 
personal injury.”147 The court gave the typical wrongful discharge 
lawsuit as an example, stating “wage loss is typically caused by 
the tortious employment termination, not by any physical injury 
that may also have been caused by the wrongful discharge.”148 
The court determined that Banaitis’s alleged physical injuries 
“did not cause his wage loss,” and that his damages “were not 
causally related to [his] alleged personal injuries.”149 This 
analysis is nearly identical to Schleier’s analysis in which the 
Supreme Court determined that age discrimination caused both 
lost wages and a personal injury, but that the two were not 
linked.150 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not apply and that Banaitis’s damages 
award was fully taxable.151  
Banaitis and O’Gilvie illustrate that § 104(a)(2) excludes only 
damages directly caused by a “personal injury or sickness.” 
Notably, the two cases addressed § 104(a)(2)’s required causal 
connection between the taxpayer’s damages received and an 
                                                                                                     
 146. See id. (noting that “economic or commercial tort actions present a 
different circumstance,” and that “the ‘direct causal link’ question requires a 
fact-specific analysis”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.; cf. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995) (“In age 
discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of 
wages, but neither is linked to the other.”). 
 149. See Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 
personal injuries Banaitis alleges (e.g., headaches, insomnia, gastrointestinal 
disorders, bleeding gums, and back aches) did not cause his wage loss.”); see also 
Banaitis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2002-5, at 4 (2002) (determining that Banaitis’s 
economic damages were not received “on account of” his alleged personal 
injuries because “he was not forced to leave his job because of those injuries”). 
 150. Supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 
330 (“In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and 
loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.”). 
 151. See Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1081 (affirming that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion 
did not apply and that Banaitis’s damage awards “should have been included in 
his gross income”). 
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already-established personal injury.152 When Congress amended 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to add a “physical” requirement,153 
establishing § 104(a)(2)’s qualifying “personal physical injury or 
physical sickness” became a much more difficult task. 
IV. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 
The Small Business Job Protection Act154 (the 1996 Act) 
became law on August 20, 1996.155 Section 1605 of the 1996 Act 
amended § 104(a).156 Section 1605(a) specifically amended 
§ 104(a)(2), providing that gross income does not include the 
“amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received 
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as 
periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness.”157 Section 1605(b) also amended § 104(a) to 
expressly provide that “emotional distress shall not be treated as 
a physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of 
§ 104(a)(2).158  
While prohibiting emotional distress from constituting a 
physical injury or physical sickness, § 104(a) provides that the 
prohibition does not apply to “damages not in excess of the 
amount paid for medical care (described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B) Section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional distress.”159 
                                                                                                     
 152. See supra Parts III.A–B (discussing O’Gilvie and Banaitis). 
 153. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
§ 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (adding the word “physical” to § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion). 
 154. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 
Stat. 1755. 
 155. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 82 (“On August 20, 1996, President 
Clinton signed into law the Small Business Job Protection Act.”). 
 156. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
§ 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (providing amendments to § 104(a)). 
 157. Id. § 1605(a), 110 Stat. at 1838 (emphasis added). 
 158. See id. § 1605(b), 110 Stat. at 1838 (“Section 104(a) is amended by 
striking the last sentence and inserting the following sentence: ‘For purposes of 
paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or 
physical sickness.’”). 
 159. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (“The preceding sentence shall not apply to an 
amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care (described 
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional 
distress.”). 
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Section 213(d)(1)(A) defines “medical care” to include amounts 
paid “for the diagnoses, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or 
function of the body.”160 And § 213(d)(1)(B) provides that “medical 
care” includes amounts paid “for transportation primarily for and 
essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A).”161 
Presumably, this language permits a taxpayer to exclude 
damages received solely for emotional distress from gross income 
under § 104(a)(2) up to the amount the damages compensate for 
“medical care” expenses otherwise deductible under § 213(d)(1)(A) 
or (B).162 
In the 1996 Act’s legislative history (the House Report), 
Congress noted courts’ prior broad extensions of § 104(a)(2) to 
nonphysical personal injuries and reiterated that all punitive 
damages should be included in income.163 Congress did provide, 
however, that punitive damages received in a wrongful death suit 
may be excluded from gross income if applicable state law 
provides that “only punitive damages may be awarded in a 
wrongful death action.”164  
Most importantly, under the heading “Include in income 
damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries,”165 the House Report 
provided guidance on when damages would be excludable under 
§ 104(a)(2), as amended. The House Report stated that “[i]f an 
action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then 
all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom 
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or 
physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is 
the injured party.”166 Congress’s language indicated that a 
taxpayer’s action must first have its “origin” in a physical injury 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. § 213(d)(1)(A). 
 161. Id. § 213(d)(1)(B). 
 162. Id. § 213(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
 163. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–01, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1677, 1792–93 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (noting that courts have interpreted 
the exclusion broadly “to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a 
physical injury or sickness” and reiterating that punitive damages should be 
included in income). 
 164. Id. at 301. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
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or physical sickness before proceeding to determine whether an 
amount is received “on account of a personal physical injury or 
physical sickness.”167 
The House Report expressly stated, however, that emotional 
distress, including symptoms thereof, is not considered a physical 
injury or physical sickness for purposes of the § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion.168 As an example, the House Report provided that “the 
exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages 
received . . . based on a claim of employment discrimination or 
injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional 
distress.”169 When an action has its origin in a physical injury or 
physical sickness, however, and the physical injury or physical 
sickness causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress, 
§ 104(a)(2) does exclude damages allocated to such emotional 
distress. The House Report explained that “[b]ecause all damages 
received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are 
excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income 
applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional 
distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical 
sickness.”170 Lastly, the House Report stated that the gross 
income exclusion applies to medical care expenses attributable to 
emotional distress,171 affirming the presumption created by 
§ 104(a)’s text.172  
                                                                                                     
 167. See Robert W. Wood, Waiting to Exhale: Murphy Part Deux and Taxing 
Damage Awards, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, at 5 (Feb. 7–8, 2008) (“Congress 
require[s] that the action have its origin in a physical injury or sickness.”). 
 168. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (stating that the House bill 
“specifically provides that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury 
or physical sickness” and also that the term emotional distress includes 
symptoms resulting from such emotional distress). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (“[T]he exclusion from gross income specifically applies to the 
amount of damages received that is not in excess of the amount paid for medical 
care attributable to emotional distress.”). 
 172. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
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V. Section 104(a)(2)’s Exclusion After the 1996 Act 
Because Congress prohibited emotional distress and its 
resulting symptoms from being excluded from gross income under 
§ 104(a)(2), after the 1996 Act, taxpayers faced the additional 
burden of establishing that their personal injury or sickness was 
physical rather than emotional. Courts, however, continued to 
only apply Schleier’s two-part test to § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion,173 
failing to accommodate the added physical requirement. Although 
their reasoning left open the potential for misapplication, the 
circuit courts, amidst allegations of physical injuries or physical 
sicknesses, refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to taxpayers’ 
recoveries for nonphysical or emotional injuries.174 Perhaps the 
most notable—or infamous—case to do so is one the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided in 2007.175 
A. The Circuits Reach the Right Outcome 
In Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,176 after determining 
the taxpayer’s compensatory damages were not income within the 
Sixteenth Amendment’s meaning, then sua sponte vacating its 
judgment and rehearing the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit held that Murphy’s award could not be excluded 
under § 104(a)(2).177 Additionally, the court held that Murphy’s 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996 
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or 
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional 
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under 
that section.” (citation omitted)). 
 174. See infra Part V.A (discussing circuit court cases following the 1996 
Act). 
 175. See generally Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
 176. See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (holding that the taxpayer’s “compensation was not ‘received . . . on 
account of personal physical injures’ excludable from gross income under 
§ 104(a)(2)” and that § 61(a)’s gross income definition included the taxpayer’s 
award (alteration in original)). 
 177. See id. (“We hold, first, that Murphy’s compensation was not 
‘received . . . on account of personal physical injuries’ excludable from gross 
income under § 104(a)(2).” (alteration in original)). 
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compensation fell within § 61(a)’s definition of income178 and 
admitted that there is no constitutional impediment to taxing 
personal injury awards.179 
Murphy alleged that her former employer violated various 
whistleblower statutes and “blacklisted” her.180 After a hearing 
before the Secretary of Labor, an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) recommended compensatory damages totaling $70,000 to 
Murphy.181 The Department of Labor Administrative Review 
Board (Board) affirmed the ALJ’s findings and granted the 
award.182 $45,000 of the damages were allocated to “‘past and 
future emotional distress’” and $25,000 of the damages were 
allocated to “‘injury to [Murphy’s] vocational reputation.’”183 The 
court noted that “[n]one of the award was for lost wages or 
diminished earning capacity.”184 After including the full amount 
in her gross income on her 2000 tax return, Murphy filed an 
amended return seeking a $20,665 refund.185 She argued, among 
other things, that § 104(a)(2) excluded her award from her gross 
income.186 This time the D.C. Circuit rejected Murphy’s argument 
in full.187  
Before the ALJ, Murphy submitted evidence that she 
suffered both “somatic”—relating to, or affecting, the body188—
and “emotional” injuries.189 Her injuries included “bruxism,” or 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. at 180 (holding that gross income under § 61(a) included 
Murphy’s compensatory award). 
 179. See id. at 173 (agreeing with the Government’s argument that there is 
no constitutional problem with taxing personal injury awards). 
 180. See id. at 171–72 (describing the taxpayer’s original allegations). 
 181. See id. at 172 (“[T]he ALJ recommended compensatory damages 
totaling $70,000.”). 
 182. See id. (“In 1999 the Department of Labor Administrative Review 
Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and recommendations.”). 
 183. See id. (describing the damages allocation) (alteration in original). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. (stating that Ms. Murphy originally included the amount in her 
gross income and then filed an amended return). 
 186. See id. at 171 (noting Ms. Murphy’s arguments that her award should 
be excluded or that taxing her award was unconstitutional). 
 187. See id. (“We reject Murphy’s argument in all aspects.”). 
 188. See id. at 174 (defining “somatic”). 
 189. See id. at 172 (“A psychologist testified that Murphy had sustained both 
‘somatic’ and ‘emotional’ injuries . . . .”). 
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teeth grinding, and “‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and 
dizziness.’”190 Murphy argued that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not 
require a “physical stimulus” and that “‘substantial physical 
problems caused by emotional distress’” should be considered a 
physical injury or physical sickness.191 The D.C. Circuit did not 
agree, finding that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not apply to 
Murphy’s award.192 
The court first cited § 104(a)(2)’s post-amble, which states 
that “‘emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury 
or physical sickness,’”193 then addressed the Government’s 
contentions.194 The Government argued that O’Gilvie dictated a 
“strong causal connection” between Murphy’s received damages 
and her alleged physical injuries.195 This meant Murphy had to 
demonstrate that her damages were awarded “because of” her 
physical injuries, which the Government claimed she failed to 
do.196 Further, based on the Board’s failure to reference any of 
Murphy’s physical injuries—especially her bruxism—the 
Government argued that “‘there was no direct causal link 
between the damages award at issue and [Murphy’s] bruxism.’”197 
The court agreed that a strong causal link was required, finding 
that O’Gilvie’s analysis of § 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement 
remained controlling after the 1996 Act.198  
                                                                                                     
 190. See id. (noting Murphy’s alleged injuries). 
 191. See id. at 175 (noting Murphy’s contentions as to why her award should 
be excluded from her gross income by § 104(a)(2)). 
 192. See id. at 176 (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did “not permit Murphy to 
exclude her award from gross income”). 
 193. See id. at 174 (“[F]or purposes of this exclusion, ‘emotional distress 
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.’” (citing 
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006))). 
 194. See id. at 175 (addressing the Government’s arguments as to why 
Murphy’s award should not be excluded). 
 195. See id. (noting the Government’s argument that the Supreme Court in 
O’Gilvie read § 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” language to require a “strong causal 
connection”). 
 196. See id. (“The Government therefore concludes Murphy must 
demonstrate she was awarded damages ‘because of’ her physical injuries, which 
the Government claims she has failed to do.”). 
 197. See id. (stating that the Board made no reference in its award to 
Murphy’s physical injuries and noting the Government’s argument) (alteration 
in original). 
 198. See id. at 176 (finding that O’Gilvie’s analysis of the phrase “on account 
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Next, the court conceded that Murphy suffered “physical 
manifestations of emotional distress,” and that the ALJ may have 
at best “considered her physical injuries indicative of the severity 
of [her] emotional distress.”199 The court concluded, however, that 
because “her physical injuries themselves were not the reason for 
the award,” Murphy’s damages were not awarded “because of” her 
physical injuries.200 Thus, Murphy could not use § 104(a)(2) to 
exclude her award from gross income.201 
Other circuits have also refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion to damage awards in which the taxpayers alleged to 
have suffered physical injuries.202 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, in Johnson v. United States,203 refused to 
exclude any portion of a taxpayer’s award under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)204 for being unlawfully terminated.205 
The taxpayer suffered physical injuries while working as a 
juvenile guard for the State of Colorado’s Department of 
Corrections and attempting to restrain an inmate.206 After the 
injuries, the taxpayer was unable to perform the duties of a 
juvenile guard.207 Instead of accommodating him under the ADA 
with another job he could perform, Colorado terminated his 
                                                                                                     
of” remained controlling). 
 199. See id. (acknowledging that Murphy suffered physical injuries and that 
the ALJ may have considered them when recommending her award) (emphasis 
added). 
 200. See id. (concluding that Murphy’s “damages were not ‘awarded by 
reason of, or because of, . . . [physical] personal injuries’” (alterations in original) 
(citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996))). 
 201. See id. (“Therefore, § 104(a)(2) does not permit Murphy to exclude her 
award from gross income.”). 
 202. See generally, e.g., Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. United States, 76 
F. App’x 873 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 203. Johnson v. United States, 76 F. App’x 873, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s ADA damages award for 
front and back pay from his gross income). 
 204. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 205. See Johnson, 76 F. App’x at 877–78 (concluding that none of the 
taxpayer’s damages could be excluded from his gross income under § 104(a)(2)). 
 206. See id. at 874 (noting that the taxpayer received physical injuries while 
attempting to restrain a juvenile inmate). 
 207. See id. (noting that the taxpayer’s injuries prohibited him from 
fulfilling his duties as a guard). 
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employment.208 He sued the State of Colorado in state court and a 
jury returned a verdict in his favor.209 
The taxpayer did not challenge the taxability of the portion of 
the jury verdict allocated to “emotional distress, pain, suffering 
and mental anguish.”210 Instead, the taxpayer sought to exclude 
the $293,400 amount awarded for back and front pay from his 
gross income.211 He argued that § 104(a)(2) excluded the damages 
because his physical injuries led to his unlawful termination.212 
The court refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to the award, 
however, reasoning that because the unlawful termination caused 
the loss of income, and not any alleged personal physical 
injury,213 the damages were not received “on account of personal 
physical injuries.”214 
When faced with similar issues, the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits reached results similar to the Tenth Circuit’s.215 In 
Stadnyk v. Commissioner,216 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                     
 208. See id. (noting that Colorado terminated his employment). 
 209. See id. (noting that the taxpayer sued). 
 210. See id. (noting that the taxpayer only sought a refund for the “tax 
liability on the back and front pay portions of the award”). 
 211. See id.  
 212. See id. at 876 (noting the taxpayer’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded 
his award because his physical injuries led to his unlawful termination). 
 213. See id. at 877 (“[T]he actual cause of the loss of income and the ADA 
action was the unlawful termination, not the personal physical injury.”); cf. 
Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995) (“In age discrimination, the 
discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is 
linked to the other.”); Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that wage loss is directly caused by the employment discrimination, 
not by any physical injury). 
 214. See Johnson v. United States, 76 F. App’x 873, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that the front and back pay damages lacked a “direct causal link” to 
the taxpayer’s physical injuries and were therefore not received “on account of” 
such injuries). 
 215. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that the taxpayer’s award for false imprisonment claims could not 
be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal 
connection between any physical injury and the settlement award”); Lindsey v. 
Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 104(a)(2) did not 
exclude the taxpayer’s settlement for “claims for tortious interference with 
contracts, for personal injury including injury to [his] personal and professional 
reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and embarrassment”). 
 216. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2010)  (holding 
that the taxpayer’s award for false imprisonment claims could not be excluded 
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Sixth Circuit found § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion inapplicable to a 
$49,000 settlement award for claims relating to false 
imprisonment.217 Although the taxpayer had testified she 
suffered no physical injuries resulting from her arrest and 
detention, and nothing in the record suggested a physical injury, 
she nonetheless argued that her physical restraint alone 
constituted a personal physical injury.218 The court disagreed.219 
The Sixth Circuit determined that false imprisonment did not 
necessarily involve a physical injury,220 and concluded there was 
no “direct causal link” between any other alleged physical injures 
and the settlement award.221 
In Lindsey v. Commissioner,222 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s denial of § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion to the taxpayer’s (Lindsey) $2 million settlement for 
claims against the taxpayer’s former employer.223 Lindsey’s 
claims included “tortious interference with contracts, . . . personal 
injury including injury to [his] personal and professional 
reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and 
embarrassment.”224 Lindsey alleged that he suffered physical 
stress-related symptoms including hypertension, periodic 
                                                                                                     
from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal connection 
between  any physical injury and the settlement award”). 
 217. See id. at 594 (finding § 104(a)(2) inapplicable to the taxpayer’s 
settlement award). 
 218. See id. at 592–93 (noting that “Mrs. Stadnyk testified that she did not 
suffer any physical injury as a result of her arrest and detention,” that 
“[n]othing in the record suggests that Mrs. Stadnyk suffered physical, as 
opposed to emotional, injuries,” and that she argued that her physical restraint 
alone constituted a physical injury). 
 219. See id. at 593 (determining that a false imprisonment victim is not 
necessarily physically injured). 
 220. See id.  
 221. See id. at 594 (“Petitioners have failed to offer any concrete evidence 
demonstrating a causal connection between any physical injury and the 
settlement award.”). 
 222. Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
§ 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s settlement for “claims for tortious 
interference with contracts, for personal injury including injury to [his] personal 
and professional reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and 
embarrassment”). 
 223. See id. (“Therefore, the tax court properly denied the exclusion.”). 
 224. Id. at 685. 
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impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary 
incontinence.225 Before the Eighth Circuit, Lindsey argued that 
the Tax Court erroneously concluded that § 104(a)(2) did not 
apply to any portion of the award.226 
In the Tax Court opinion under review, the court looked both 
to the settlement’s terms and the payor’s intent when analyzing 
whether § 104(a)(2) excluded Lindsey’s settlement.227 First, the 
Tax Court stated that Congress explicitly excluded “emotional 
distress and related injuries” from the “definition of physical 
injuries or physical sickness.”228 The court then analyzed the 
settlement’s terms, which simply reiterated Lindsey’s claims 
against his employer.229 The court found that “[i]njury to 
reputation, humiliation, and embarrassment are akin to 
emotional distress” and that “tortious interference with contracts 
is an economic injury, not a physical injury.”230 Accordingly, the 
court found that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude damages received on 
account of such claims.231 
Next, the court considered whether Lindsey’s alleged 
physical injuries served as the basis for any portion of the 
settlement agreement.232 To do this, the court analyzed the intent 
of the payor.233 Lindsey’s physician testified that he suffered 
physical manifestations of stress, including hypertension, fatigue, 
occasional indigestion, and insomnia.234 Lindsey’s physician 
further testified that Lindsey’s hypertension could lead to 
“strokes, heart attacks, and kidney disease.”235 The court stated 
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. at 688 (noting Lindsey’s alleged physical symptoms). 
 226. See id. at 687 (“Lindsey[ ] also contend[s] the Tax Court erred in finding 
the physical sickness Lindsey suffered was a type not excludable under 
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).”). 
 227. See Lindsey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2004-113, at 5–6 (analyzing the 
settlement’s terms and discerning the payor’s intent). 
 228. Id. at 5. 
 229. See id. (analyzing the settlement’s terms). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. (finding that § 104(a)(2) does not exclude damages received on 
account of such claims). 
 232. See id. at 5–6 (considering whether any portion of the settlement was 
intended to compensate Lindsey’s physical injuries). 
 233. See id. (analyzing the intent of the payor). 
 234. See id. at 5 (excerpting the physician’s testimony). 
 235. Id. 
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that Congress intended Lindsey’s injuries to be “within the 
definition of emotional distress,” citing the House Report’s 
statement that emotional distress included symptoms.236 Finally, 
the court found that even if Lindsey had suffered a “personal 
physical injury within the meaning of section 104(a)(2), such 
injury could not have been the basis for settlement” because there 
was no evidence that Lindsey communicated such injuries to the 
payor.237 
On review, the Eighth Circuit mostly confirmed the Tax 
Court’s findings and reasoning.238 Notably, though, the Eighth 
Circuit implied that § 104(a)(2) might have excluded Lindsey’s 
settlement had he done two things.239 First, the court noted the 
importance of Lindsey’s failure to make the payor aware of his 
physical injury or physical sickness.240 Second, the court stated 
that Lindsey failed to meet the on account of requirement 
because he did not demonstrate “what percentage of the 
settlement damages [was] allocable to physical injury or physical 
sickness,” and because the record’s evidence failed to do the 
same.241 The Eighth Circuit’s implications provide a blueprint for 
a taxpayer to exclude physical symptoms of emotional distress if 
his award is not expressly allocated to nonphysical or emotional 
injuries. 
Without focusing on whether the taxpayer’s action against 
the defendant had its origin in a physical injury or physical 
sickness, the circuit courts still refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion amidst allegations of physical injuries. This result was 
                                                                                                     
 236. See id. (noting that Lindsey’s injuries fell “within the definition of 
emotional distress” and citing the House Report). 
 237. See id. at 6 (“Even if petitioner had suffered a personal physical injury 
within the meaning of section 104(a)(2), such injury could not have been the 
basis for settlement because, as the parties stipulated, petitioner did not 
communicate any physical injury to [the payor] during the settlement 
negotiations.”). 
 238. See Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We affirm 
the well-reasoned decision of the Tax Court.”). 
 239. See id. at 688–89 (implying that § 104(a)(2) might have excluded 
Lindsey’s award had he made the defendant aware of the injuries and been able 
to prove that a portion of the settlement was allocated to such injuries). 
 240. See id. (noting the importance of Lindsey’s failure to communicate his 
physical injuries to the defendant). 
 241. Id. at 689. 
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possible because the damages at issue were expressly allocated to 
nonphysical injuries. Because of this allocation, the taxpayers 
were unable to prove that any portion of their award was 
intended to compensate their alleged physical injury. Thus, 
focusing on whether the received damages were “on account of a 
personal physical injury or sickness” was sufficient to reach the 
right outcome. As three conflicting Tax Court cases indicate, the 
correct result is not as readily ascertainable when the damages 
are not so neatly allocated.242 
VI. The Tax Court Reaches Conflicting Results 
A. Sanford v. Commissioner 
In 2008, the U.S. Tax Court decided Sanford v. 
Commissioner.243 Sanford held that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude 
the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal action against her 
employer for employment discrimination and sexual 
harassment.244 The taxpayer filed complaints with the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her 
employer, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS).245 She alleged that the 
USPS discriminated against her and that “she was retaliated 
against for previously participating in EEOC activity.”246 
                                                                                                     
 242. Compare Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (2008) (holding 
that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal 
action against her employer for employment discrimination and sexual 
harassment that caused emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms), 
with Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 5 (2010) (holding that 
§ 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award from her employer where 
she alleged that the employer’s conduct caused emotional distress manifested by 
physical symptoms), and Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 7 
(2010) (holding that § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award for his 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim when his emotional distress 
was manifested by a second heart attack). 
 243. Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (holding that § 104(a)(2) 
did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal action against her 
employer for employment discrimination and sexual harassment that caused 
emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms). 
 244. See id.  
 245. See id. (detailing the taxpayer’s claims against the USPS). 
 246. Id. 
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Additionally, she alleged that a USPS coworker sexually harassed 
her.247 
The EEOC found the taxpayer was discriminated against 
because of her sex, and that she was sexually harassed.248 The 
USPS Final Agency Decision awarded the taxpayer “compensatory 
damages of $7,662 in past medical expenses and transportation, 
$14,033 for past benefits lost (leave without pay), and $12,000 in 
nonpecuniary compensatory damages.”249 In 2003, the USPS paid 
the taxpayer the total damages of $33,695.250 The taxpayer then 
appealed the USPS Final Agency Decision to the EEOC.251 On 
appeal, the EEOC “noted that [the taxpayer] had provided 
sufficient documentation to substantiate or justify her request for 
additional compensatory damages,” with documentation consisting 
of statements from her friends, coworkers, and psychologist.252 The 
EEOC also noted that the documentation showed the taxpayer 
“experienced physical symptoms” due to the emotional distress and 
psychiatric problems that the long-term harassment created.253 
These physical symptoms included “intensification of petitioner’s 
asthma, sleep deprivation, skin irritation, appetite loss, severe 
headaches, and depression.”254 Accordingly, the EEOC modified 
the USPS Final Agency Decision, determining that “USPS should 
pay [the taxpayer] a total of $115,000 in nonpecuniary damages, 
$33,542 in future pecuniary losses, $7,662 for medical expenses, 
and $14,033 for use of annual leave.”255 In 2004, the USPS paid the 
taxpayer the damages.256 
The taxpayer failed to report any of the damages received in 
the legal action as income on her 2003 and 2004 tax returns,257 
                                                                                                     
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. at 2 (“Petitioner appealed the $33,695 USPS Final Agency 
Decision to the EEOC.”). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
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and the Service determined a deficiency.258 The Tax Court 
considered whether § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s received 
compensation for “nonpecuniary damages and future pecuniary 
losses.”259 The court’s analysis began by noting that “gross income 
is broad in scope, while exclusions from income are narrowly 
construed.”260 Then, the court reiterated § 104(a)(2)’s text, 
specifically stating that “emotional distress is not treated as a 
personal physical injury or physical sickness.”261 Because the 
Service conceded the taxpayer’s underlying cause of action was 
“based in tort or tort-type rights,” the court proceeded to 
determine whether the taxpayer’s damages were received on 
account of her physical injuries or physical sickness.262 
The court concluded that the taxpayer’s nonpecuniary 
damages and future pecuniary losses “were not received on 
account of personal physical injury or physical sickness” and thus 
not excluded from her gross income under § 104(a)(2).263 Because 
the taxpayer did not meet the requirements for “medical care” 
deductions under § 213, the court also concluded the taxpayer 
could not exclude the portion of the award attributed to medical 
expenses.264 When analyzing the nonpecuniary damages and 
future pecuniary losses portion, the court looked to the EEOC 
and USPS decisions, which noted that the taxpayer’s sexual 
harassment “caused her emotional distress.”265 Further, the court 
acknowledged that the taxpayer’s “emotional distress manifested 
                                                                                                     
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 3 (“We now consider whether petitioner must include in 
income the portion of the award for nonpecuniary damages and future pecuniary 
losses.”). 
 260. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995)). 
 261. See id. (“Emotional distress is not treated as a personal physical injury 
or physical sickness.” (citing I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006))). 
 262. See id. (noting that the Service conceded that the taxpayers met the 
“tort or tort-type rights” requirement and proceeding to determine whether the 
damages were received “on account of” her physical injuries or physical 
sickness). 
 263. See id. at 4 (“We conclude that the [damages] awarded to [the taxpayer] 
as a result of the legal action were not received on account of personal physical 
injury or physical sickness. [The taxpayer] therefore must include these 
damages in her income under section 104(a)(2).”). 
 264. See id. (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude taxpayer’s portion of 
the award for “past medical expenses and transportation”). 
 265. Id. at 3. 
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itself in [the] physical symptoms” noted in the EEOC decision but 
found that “[t]hese physical symptoms were not the basis of the 
award.”266 Instead, the taxpayer was awarded relief for sexual 
harassment and sex-based discrimination, and was 
“compensated . . . for the emotional distress she suffered because 
of the sexual harassment.”267 Importantly, the Tax Court stated 
that “[d]amages received on account of emotional distress, even 
when resultant physical symptoms occur, are not excludable from 
income under section 104(a)(2).”268 This statement is entirely 
consistent with § 104(a)(2)’s legislative history in which Congress 
provided that the term “emotional distress” included symptoms. 
B. Domeny v. Commissioner 
Less than two years later, in Domeny v. Commissioner,269 the 
Tax Court reached a conclusion directly contrary to Sanford.270 
After being terminated, the taxpayer complained that her pre-
existing multiple sclerosis (MS) “spik[ed],” and that she suffered 
“shooting pain up her legs, fatigue, burning eyes, spinning head, 
vertigo, and lightheadedness.”271 Before filing suit, however, the 
taxpayer’s attorney negotiated a settlement agreement with her 
former employer.272 In the settlement agreement, the taxpayer 
released potential claims under the ADA, the ADEA, and 
potential claims for invasion of privacy, defamation and 
misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress.273 The 
                                                                                                     
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-149 (2005)). 
 269. Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 5 (2010) (holding that 
§ 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award from her employer where 
she alleged that the employer’s conduct caused emotional distress manifested by 
physical symptoms). 
 270. See id. at 5 (concluding § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement 
award because her work environment exacerbated her physical illness). 
 271. Id. at 2. 
 272. See id. (noting that a settlement agreement was reached before any suit 
was filed). 
 273. See id. (listing the causes of action that the taxpayer released pursuant 
to the settlement agreement). 
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settlement agreement made no mention of the taxpayer’s alleged 
physical symptoms.274  
The taxpayer’s employer paid a total of $33,308 under the 
agreement.275 Of the total, $16,375 was sent directly to the 
taxpayer’s attorney.276 The Tax Court addressed the sole question 
of whether § 104(a)(2) excluded the settlement agreement’s 
remaining $16,933, which was sent directly to the taxpayer and 
not included as income on her tax return.277 
The court began by noting that the taxpayer believed she was 
being compensated “for physical injuries that occurred in a 
hostile work environment.”278 Next, the court noted § 104(a)(2)’s 
text, including the post-amble, which states that “emotional 
distress shall not be treated as physical injury or physical 
sickness.”279 After summarily concluding the settlement 
agreement was ambiguous, the court proceeded to analyze the 
payor’s intent.280 The court also concluded that the taxpayer’s 
claim against her employer was based on tort or tort-type 
rights.281 Finally, the court analyzed whether there was a “direct 
causal link” between the damages and the taxpayer’s alleged 
physical injuries.282 
The taxpayer’s employer did not withhold taxes on the 
$16,933 at issue and labeled the amount as “[n]onemployee 
compensation.”283 Based on this fact alone, the Tax Court inferred 
that the taxpayer’s employer “was aware that at least part of [the 
taxpayer’s] recovery may not have been subject to tax; i.e., was 
due to physical illness.”284 The court then coupled that inference 
                                                                                                     
 274. See id. at 3 (noting that the settlement agreement contained only a list 
of “numerous possible causes of action that [the taxpayer] was releasing”). 
 275. Id. at 2. 
 276. Id. Half of the $16,375 was compensation due to the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer reported that as income on her 2005 tax return. Id. The taxpayer was 
not issued any tax forms on the other half sent to her attorney and did not 
report it as income. Id. 
 277. Id. at 3. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. (citing Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 283. Id. at 4. 
 284. Id. 
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with the “likelihood that [the taxpayer’s] attorney represented 
[the taxpayer’s] circumstances to [her employer] in the course of 
the settlement negotiations.”285 Based solely on these bare 
inferences—and ignoring the settlement agreement’s terms—the 
Tax Court found that the taxpayer’s employer intended to 
compensate her for “her acute physical illness caused by her 
hostile and stressful work environment.”286 Thus, because the 
taxpayer had “shown that her work environment exacerbated her 
existing physical illness,” she had “shown that the only reason for 
the $16,933 payment was to compensate her for her physical 
injuries.”287  
Domeny’s conclusion cannot be squared with Sanford. In 
Sanford, the EEOC and the court explicitly noted that the 
taxpayer’s emotional distress caused physical symptoms, 
including intensifying her preexisting asthma.288 In Domeny, the 
taxpayer’s emotional distress caused physical symptoms, 
including intensifying her preexisting MS.289 Yet § 104(a)(2) was 
applied to the award in Domeny and not in Sanford.290 A Tax 
Court case decided later in 2010 is further indicative of this 
inconsistent application.  
C. Parkinson v. Commissioner 
In Parkinson v. Commissioner,291 the taxpayer asserted 
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion 
of privacy against his former employer (medical center) and two 
                                                                                                     
 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. at 5. 
 288. See Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 3 (2008) (“We further 
acknowledge, as did the EEOC, that the emotional distress manifested itself in 
physical symptoms such as asthma.”). 
 289. See Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 2 (2010) (noting that the 
taxpayer suffered physical symptoms of her emotional distress, including 
exacerbating her preexisting MS). 
 290. See supra Parts VI.A–B (discussing Sanford and Domeny).  
 291. See Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 7 (2010) (holding 
that § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award for his intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim when his emotional distress was 
manifested by a second heart attack). 
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named coworkers.292 The taxpayer’s complaint alleged that the 
two named coworkers “harassed and harangued” him, causing 
him to suffer “severe emotional distress, manifested by 
permanent, irreparable physical harm in the form of his second 
heart attack.”293 For both claims, the “complaint sought $500,000 
in compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive damages, 
attorney’s fees, and costs.”294 The day after a jury trial began, the 
“medical center agree[d] to pay [the taxpayer] $350,000 ‘as 
noneconomic damages and not as wages or other income,’”295 and 
the taxpayer agreed to drop all claims.296 In 2005, the taxpayer 
received a $34,000 payment pursuant to the settlement 
agreement but failed to report this amount on his 2005 federal 
income tax return.297  
After considering the settlement agreement’s terms and the 
payor’s intent, the court first concluded that “the entire 
settlement payment [wa]s allocable to [the taxpayer’s] cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”298 Then, the 
Tax Court concluded that § 104(a)(2) excluded one-half of the 
taxpayer’s 2005 settlement payment because it “was made on 
account of [the taxpayer’s] physical injuries.”299 In support of its 
conclusion, the court looked to the 1996 Act’s House Report.300  
First, the Tax Court acknowledged the House Report 
provided that the term “emotional distress” included 
symptoms.301 Next, the court quoted the portion of the House 
Report that stated that “[b]ecause all damages received on 
account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable 
from gross income, the exclusion . . . applies to any damages 
received based on a claim of emotional distress that is 
                                                                                                     
 292. See id. at 1–2 (detailing the taxpayer’s complaint). 
 293. Id. at 2. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See id. (“Pursuant to the settlement agreement [the taxpayer] agreed to 
drop all his claims.”). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. at 6 (finding one-half of the settlement amount excluded). 
 300. Id. at 5. 
 301. Id. 
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attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.”302 The 
court stated that this language, with respect to a claim for 
emotional distress, indicated Congress’s intent to distinguish 
“damages attributable to physical injury or physical sickness, 
which are excludable, from damages attributable to emotional 
distress or ‘symptoms’ thereof, which are not excludable.”303 The 
court took the House Report’s language out of context and read it 
incorrectly.  
Parkinson dropped the origin of the action portion of the 
House Report, focusing instead only on the end result. The House 
Report provided that damages for emotional distress qualified for 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion only when a personal physical injury or 
physical sickness caused emotional distress.304 In other words, 
when a taxpayer’s personal physical injury or physical sickness 
causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress, then the 
damages allocated to such emotional distress will be on account of 
the personal physical injury or physical sickness. As Parkinson 
reads the House Report, damages allocated to a physical 
symptom of emotional distress would fall within § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion because they are on account of the physical symptom. 
Under that reading, damages allocated to emotional distress 
caused by a physical injury or physical sickness would be on 
account of emotional distress. This is directly contrary to the 
statute’s text and its legislative history. Section 104(a) explicitly 
states that damages on account of emotional distress should be 
included in income.305 Congress intended for damages allocable to 
emotional distress caused by a physical injury to fall within 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion only because all of those damages have 
their “origin in a physical injury or physical sickness.”306 
                                                                                                     
 302. Id.  
 303. Id.  
 304. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing that § 104(a)(2) 
excluded damages allocated to emotional distress “on account of” a physical 
injury or physical sickness). 
 305. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (“[E]motional distress shall not be treated as 
a physical injury or physical sickness.”). 
 306. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing that § 104(a)(2) 
excluded damages allocated to emotional distress “on account of” a physical 
injury or physical sickness). 
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Next, the Tax Court stated it was “self-evident that a heart 
attack and its physical aftereffects constitute physical injury or 
sickness rather than mere subjective sensations or symptoms of 
emotional distress.”307 A heart attack is undoubtedly a “severe” 
physical symptom, but it is a “symptom” nonetheless. In fact, the 
taxpayer stated in his complaint that he “suffered severe 
emotional distress, manifested by permanent, irreparable 
physical harm in the form of his second heart attack.”308 Because 
the taxpayer’s emotional distress manifested itself with such a 
severe physical symptom, he received a large sum as settlement 
for his claim.309 This does not mean, however, that the taxpayer’s 
larger sum should not be taxed, while someone suffering a 
“milder” physical symptom—and consequently receiving a 
smaller settlement—should be taxed.310  
Lastly, the Tax Court relied on treatise excerpts, stating that 
when a plaintiff is compensated for emotional distress that is 
evidenced by physical symptoms, both the mental and physical 
elements have been compensated.311 The Tax Court is correct that 
the medical center compensated the taxpayer for both elements of 
his emotional distress. But simply because both the mental and 
the physical elements have been compensated for does not mean 
each element should be taxed separately rather than taxed as one 
recovery for emotional distress. Under Parkinson’s reasoning, 
every taxpayer suffering a physical symptom of emotional 
distress would be entitled to exclude a court-determined amount 
of any potential recovery under § 104(a)(2). The analytical 
difficulties of drawing a line between the emotional and the 
physical elements would make judicial determinations, at best, 
                                                                                                     
 307. Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 5 (2010). 
 308. Id. at 2. 
 309. The taxpayer received $350,000. Id. 
 310. See, e.g., Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 176 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s $70,000 
award for emotional injuries manifested by physical symptoms, such as 
“bruxism”). 
 311. See Parkinson, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 5–6 (stating that, when a 
plaintiff is compensated for emotional distress accompanied by physical 
symptoms, both the physical and the mental elements have been compensated 
(citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)) (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 12, at 64 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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wildly speculative. As a result, the tax consequences of emotional 
distress recoveries would be entirely unpredictable. 
Moreover, when Congress stated that the term emotional 
distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional 
distress,312 it indicated that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion does not 
consider emotional distress’s physical symptoms as a stand-alone 
physical injury or physical sickness. Instead, a recovery for 
“emotional distress” encompasses its physical symptoms, no 
matter their severity. As the Tax Court previously stated, 
“[d]amages received on account of emotional distress, even when 
resultant physical symptoms occur, are not excludable from 
income under section 104(a)(2).”313 
VII. Proposal: A New Test 
Before the 1996 Act, the “origin” of the “personal injury” 
giving rise to damages was a nonissue for a few reasons. First, 
Burke’s “tort or tort-type rights” test ensured that § 104(a)(2) 
excluded only damages compensating for personal-injury torts, or 
for personal injuries where the full range of tort-type remedies 
were available.314 The test intended to “distinguish damages for 
personal injuries from, for example, damages for breach of 
contract.”315 Second, § 104(a)(2) excluded all personal injuries, 
physical, nonphysical, and emotional.316  
                                                                                                     
 312. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term 
emotional distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional 
distress). 
 313.  Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 3 (2008) (citing Hawkins 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-149 (2005)). 
 314. See Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or 
Physical Sickness, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153 (proposed Sept. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation] (stating that 
the “tort or tort type rights” requirement “intended to ensure that only damages 
compensating for torts and similar personal injuries qualif[ied] for exclusion 
under § 104(a)(2)”).  
 315. See Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or 
Physical Sickness, 77 Fed. Reg. 3106, 3107 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1) [hereinafter Final Regulation] (“The tort-type rights test 
was intended to distinguish damages for personal injuries from, for example, 
damages for breach of contract.”). 
 316. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992) (noting that 
the exclusion’s scope had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but 
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After the 1996 Act, on the other hand, Treasury amended its 
§ 104(a)(2) regulations that served as the basis for Burke’s 
requirement, thus eliminating Burke’s tort or tort-type rights 
test.317 In the amendment’s proposal, Treasury stated that 
judicial and legislative developments—including the 1996 Act—
have “eliminated the need to base the section 104(a)(2) exclusion 
on tort and remedies concepts.”318 The amended regulations 
extend § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to “personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness not defined as torts under state and common 
law,” and to no-fault statutes.319 Section 104(a)(2)’s exclusion no 
longer “depend[s] on the scope of remedies available under state 
or common law.”320 Replacing the tort or tort-type rights 
requirement, the amended regulations define § 104(a)(2) 
“damages” as “an amount received (other than workers’ 
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or 
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of 
prosecution.”321 
Additionally, § 104(a)(2) now excludes only damages received 
“on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”322 
Because of the added “physical” requirement, defendants can be 
liable for “personal injury” compensatory damages that 
§ 104(a)(2) no longer excludes. For example, a defendant’s 
conduct may directly cause a taxpayer to suffer emotional 
distress. Before the 1996 Act, the taxpayer’s emotional distress 
would have qualified as a “personal injury” for purposes of 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion. If the defendant then paid the taxpayer 
damages on account of such emotional distress, § 104(a)(2) would 
exclude those damages as being on account of a personal injury. 
Now, however, because § 104(a) prohibits emotional distress from 
being treated as a physical injury or physical sickness, § 104(a)(2) 
                                                                                                     
that it was now settled that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the 
individual”). 
 317. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (eliminating the “tort 
or tort type rights” requirement). 
 318. Proposed Regulation, supra note 314, at 47,153. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012). 
 322. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added); see supra Part IV 
(discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996). 
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does not exclude damages received on account of the “personal 
injury” of emotional distress. Thus, defendants can be liable for 
“personal injury” compensatory damages—damages that would 
have been excluded before the 1996 Act—without directly causing 
a “physical injury or physical sickness.” 
This creates the problem that was illustrated in Domeny and 
in Parkinson. According to Domeny and Parkinson, damages 
allocated to a physical symptom of emotional distress may be 
excluded if the taxpayer could show that the damages 
compensated for, or were “on account of,” the physical 
symptom.323 In Lindsey, the Eighth Circuit implied that to do so, 
a taxpayer simply has to alert the defendant to the taxpayer’s 
physical symptom and then prove that at least a portion of the 
award is intended to compensate for the physical symptom.324 
This result directly contradicts the exclusion’s text, however, 
which states that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a 
physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion,325 and the House Report, which states that “emotional 
distress” includes resulting symptoms.326 To remedy this 
contradiction, it is necessary to focus on whether the taxpayer’s 
action against the defendant has its origin in a physical injury or 
physical sickness. 
As Treasury noted when it proposed amending its 
regulations, judicial and legislative developments have affected 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.327 Most importantly, the 1996 Act added 
the requirement that a taxpayer’s “personal injury or sickness” 
must be “physical.”328 To accommodate that added requirement, a 
new test needs to be implemented to prevent results—such as 
                                                                                                     
 323. See supra Parts VI.B–C (discussing Domeny and Parkinson). 
 324. Supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 325. I.R.C. § 104(a). 
 326. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term 
emotional distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional 
distress). 
 327. See Proposed Regulation, supra note 314, at 47, 152–53 (noting that 
judicial and legislative developments have affected § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion that 
Treasury’s proposed regulations reflect the statutory developments). 
 328. Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996 
amendment . . . imposes an additional requirement for an amount to qualify for 
exclusion from gross income under that section.”). 
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Domeny and Parkinson—that contradict § 104(a)(2)’s text and 
legislative history.  
Under the new test, to be excluded from gross income under 
§ 104(a)(2): (1) an amount must be received (other than workers’ 
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or 
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of 
prosecution; (2) such legal suit or action must have its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness; and (3) the amount must be 
received on account of such physical injury or physical sickness.  
The test’s three requirements must each be satisfied 
independently. The first requirement is taken from § 104(a)(2)’s 
text and Treasury’s proposed regulations. As Treasury intended, 
it replaces the tort or tort-type rights requirement and defines 
§ 104(a)(2) “damages.” The requirement functions as Treasury 
detailed in its proposed regulations above329 and thus needs no 
additional explanation here. The test’s third requirement derives 
from § 104(a)(2)’s on account of text and incorporates all the case 
law interpreting that language. The cases interpreting on account 
of are detailed earlier in Part III of this Note.330 Accordingly, the 
third requirement also requires no further explanation here. The 
test’s second requirement derives from § 104(a)(2)’s text combined 
with Congress’s language in the House Report. The test’s second 
requirement works in unity with the first and needs additional 
explanation. 
A. The “Origin” Requirement 
When a statute is ambiguous on its face—as § 104(a)(2)’s 
language has always been331—courts should view the legislative 
history to determine Congress’s intent.332 Appropriately, then, the 
test’s second requirement is drawn from the House Report that 
                                                                                                     
 329. Supra notes 318–21 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra Part III (discussing the case law refining § 104(a)(2)’s “on 
account of” text). 
 331. See O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 79 (1996) (acknowledging 
that the “on account of” phrase in § 104(a)(2) is ambiguous). 
 332. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 
U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (stating that the Court first looks to the statutory text and 
then reviews the legislative history to determine congressional intent). 
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gave guidance on how to apply the amended § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion.333 According to the House Report, to qualify for 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion, the taxpayer’s “action” against the 
defendant must have its “origin in a physical injury or physical 
sickness.”334 This requirement, combined with the regulations’ 
use of “legal suit or action,” forms the test’s second component.  
The word “origin” is commonly defined as “the point at which 
something begins or rises” or as “something that creates, causes, 
or gives rise to another.”335 Thus, to qualify for § 104(a)(2)’s 
exclusion, a physical injury or physical sickness must create, 
cause, or give rise to the taxpayer’s “legal suit or action” against 
the defendant. Except in the context of a wrongful death or 
survival suit, this origin requirement will be satisfied only when 
the defendant’s conduct directly causes the taxpayer’s personal 
physical injury or physical sickness, thus giving rise to the 
taxpayer’s action against the defendant. This requires that there 
be a “direct causal link” between the defendant’s conduct and the 
taxpayer’s personal physical injury or physical sickness.  
For example, in Schleier’s automobile accident illustration, 
the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries suffered in the 
automobile accident gave rise to the taxpayer’s negligence action 
against the defendant.336 Without an intervening emotional 
injury, the defendant’s negligent conduct directly caused the 
taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, including bruises, cuts, or 
broken bones. Because the defendant directly caused the 
taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, the defendant was liable for 
damages on account of the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries. 
Thus, the taxpayer’s “legal suit or action” against the defendant—
that may have resulted in other claims such as lost wages, or 
                                                                                                     
 333. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing the “origin” 
requirement). 
 334. See id. (“If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical 
sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom 
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical 
sickness . . . .”); see also Wood, supra note 167, at 5 (“Congress require[s] that 
the action have its origin in a physical injury or sickness.”). 
 335. Origin Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/origin (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (defining origin) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 336. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (using an automobile 
accident example to illustrate a personal injury). 
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pain, suffering, and emotional distress—had its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness. 
In the context of a wrongful death or survival suit, the 
taxpayer’s action against the defendant has its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness because the taxpayer’s action 
originated out of the decedent’s death, which the defendant 
directly caused. Because the taxpayer could not have prosecuted 
the action against the defendant absent the decedent’s personal 
physical injury of death, the decedent’s death gave rise to the 
spouse’s action. Therefore, the decedent’s death was the origin of 
the spouse’s wrongful death or survival action against the 
defendant. The taxpayer’s action may then include claims for loss 
of consortium and pain, suffering, and emotional distress, but the 
action’s origin was in a physical injury or physical sickness.337 
On the other hand, the origin requirement will not be 
satisfied when the defendant’s conduct directly causes the 
taxpayer to suffer emotional distress manifested by a physical 
symptom, even if the physical symptom alone could be considered 
a physical injury or physical sickness. With employment 
discrimination or wrongful termination, the defendant’s conduct 
directly causes lost wages and nonphysical personal injuries, such 
as emotional distress, but does not directly cause a physical 
injury or physical sickness.338 Because the defendant’s conduct 
only directly causes the taxpayer’s emotional distress, there is no 
direct causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the 
taxpayer’s physical symptom. The taxpayer can still bring an 
action against the defendant for infliction of emotional distress 
and lost wages, but the action would not have its origin in a 
physical injury or physical sickness. Thus, the taxpayer would 
fail to meet the test’s second requirement.  
In Parkinson, for example, the defendant’s conduct directly 
caused the taxpayer’s emotional distress.339 The taxpayer’s 
emotional distress then manifested itself with the severe physical 
                                                                                                     
 337. Cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (noting that a taxpayer’s 
claim for loss of consortium due to his spouse’s physical injury or physical 
sickness would be excluded from gross income). 
 338. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (using an automobile 
accident example to illustrate a personal injury). 
 339. See supra Part VI.C (discussing Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2010-142 (2010)). 
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symptom of a heart attack. The taxpayer’s emotional distress 
severed the direct causal link between the defendant’s conduct 
and the physical symptom. Thus, the taxpayer’s heart attack was 
not the origin of his action against the defendant. Rather, the 
taxpayer’s severe emotional distress was the origin of his action 
against the defendant and the emotional distress then gave rise 
to his physical injury.  
Importantly, the immediacy of the physical symptom’s onset 
does not affect this result. Consider a taxpayer-employee that is 
deathly afraid of snakes.340 If her employer places a rubber snake 
in her office and she immediately suffers a heart attack upon 
seeing the snake, her heart attack will not be the origin of her 
action against her employer. Instead, her cause of action for 
infliction of emotional distress will have its origin in her severe 
emotional distress, which was manifested by a heart attack.341 
These consequential physical symptoms may, of course, indicate 
the severity of the defendant-inflicted emotional distress and 
thus increase the total damages sum.342 But this does not mean 
that a taxpayer suffering physical consequences of emotional 
distress should be better off from a tax perspective than a 
taxpayer whose emotional distress does not have physical 
consequences. 
Admittedly, there can be confusion when the defendant 
simultaneously inflicts separate emotional and physical injuries. 
This scenario is best illustrated in the sexual harassment and 
false imprisonment contexts. As the Service explained in a 
private letter ruling in 2000, when sexual harassment takes the 
form of an “unwanted or uninvited physical contact[] resulting in 
observable bodily harms,” then § 104(a)(2) excludes damages 
allocable to such injuries.343 But when the sexual harassment is 
                                                                                                     
 340. This example was provided by Professor Brant J. Hellwig. 
 341. If the employee died as a result of her heart attack and her husband 
brought a wrongful death action against her employer, then the husband’s 
action would have its origin in the physical injury of death. Thus, § 104(a)(2) 
would exclude damages that he received “on account of” his wife’s death. 
 342. Cf. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 176 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (noting that the Administrative Law Judge may have considered the 
taxpayer’s physical injuries “indicative of the severity of [her] emotional 
distress”). 
 343. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (providing that 
§ 104(a)(2) would exclude damages allocated to “unwanted or uninvited physical 
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nonphysical and causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress 
§ 104(a)(2) does not exclude any damages attributable to the 
emotional distress, even if accompanied by physical symptoms.344 
Similarly, as the Sixth Circuit explained in Stadnyk, false 
imprisonment does not necessarily involve a physical injury.345 
Presumably, if the false imprisonment took the form of an 
“unwanted or uninvited physical contact[] resulting in observable 
bodily harms,” then § 104(a)(2) would exclude damages attributable 
to such injuries.346 But § 104(a)(2) would not exclude damages 
attributable to emotional distress resulting from the false 
imprisonment’s nonphysical aspects, such as confinement alone.347 
In these scenarios, the physical injury or physical sickness does 
not have to be the action’s sole origin. Because the defendant 
directly caused the taxpayer’s personal physical injury, and that 
personal physical injury is one of the origins of the taxpayer’s action 
against the defendant, the test’s second requirement would be met. 
A court would then have to determine what portion of the damages 
is on account of the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, and thus 
excluded by § 104(a)(2). Section 104(a)(2) would not, however, 
exclude the portion of damages flowing from, or directly caused by, 
the taxpayer’s emotional distress, except in the amount not 
exceeding qualifying medical care under § 213. 
                                                                                                     
contacts resulting in observable bodily harms”). 
 344. See id. (providing that § 104(a)(2) would exclude only damages allocated 
to “unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily 
harms”); see also Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (2008) (holding 
that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal 
action against her employer for sexual harassment that caused emotional 
distress manifested by physical symptoms). 
 345. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(determining that a false imprisonment victim is not necessarily physically 
injured). 
 346. Cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (sexual harassment). 
 347. Cf. Stadnyk, 367 F. App’x at 594 (holding that the taxpayer’s award for 
false imprisonment claims could not be excluded from gross income under 
§ 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal connection between any physical injury 
and the settlement award”). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Of course, it still remains difficult to draw the line between 
physical and nonphysical. Some commentators have suggested that 
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion be repealed due to the difficulty with drawing 
such a line.348 Others have suggested rewriting the exclusion to 
apply only to damages attributable to lost human capital,349 or that 
the Service adopt definitions from the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts.350 No matter where the line is drawn between physical and 
nonphysical, however, some taxpayers will be better off than others. 
Although Congress did not explicitly define physical when it 
amended § 104(a)(2),351 it stated both in the statutory text and the 
House Report that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a 
physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of the exclusion.352 
Importantly, the House Report provided that the term emotional 
distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional 
distress.353 By providing that emotional distress and its resulting 
symptoms are not to be treated as a physical injury or physical 
sickness, Congress excluded emotional distress from its definition of 
physical. Section 104(a)(2) does not exclude a taxpayer’s recovery for 
emotional distress, unless an originating physical injury or physical 
sickness causes the taxpayer’s emotional distress. To prevent the 
inconsistency of having § 104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion 
extended to some physical symptoms of emotional distress, but not 
others, it is necessary to focus on whether the taxpayer’s action has 
its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness. 
                                                                                                     
 348. See Barret, supra note 13, at 1194 (“In order to promote predictability 
and consistency, the exclusion should be eliminated.”). 
 349. See Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis 
and Update, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 61, 62 (1997) (proposing that § 104(a)(2) should 
be redrafted and only encompass “damages attributable to lost human capital 
and not lost wages and earning power”). 
 350. See Wright, supra note 7, at 215 (proposing that the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts’ definition be adopted). 
 351. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 300–01 (failing to define 
“physical injury or physical sickness”); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 
(Oct. 13, 2000) (“The term ‘personal physical injuries’ is not defined in either 
§ 104(a)(2) or the legislative history of the 1996 Act.”). 
 352. See supra Part III (discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996). 
 353. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term 
“emotional distress” includes symptoms). 
